olaf
1f7099a3ed
Created 6 new investigative articles covering Swiss IT failures from 2020-2024: - INSIEME: CHF 116M tax software failure (2020-03) - Swiss E-Voting: Security flaw cancellation (2020-08) - SECO Corruption: CHF 99M contract scandal (2021-02) - Juris X: Zürich's 16-year software odyssey (2022-06) - Swisscom: 8-hour emergency services outage (2024-07) - Credit Suisse: 3,000 applications integration nightmare (2024-11) Added article-card shortcode and CSS for homepage layout. Updated homepage to display all investigations with featured cards. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "SwissFini.sh"
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---
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{{< article-card
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title="SCION: The Emperor's New Internet?"
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subtitle="After 16 years and millions in funding, Switzerland's \"revolutionary\" internet architecture still requires the same expensive private infrastructure it promised to replace."
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category="Investigation"
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date="December 2025"
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link="/articles/scion-vs-sdwan/"
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featured="true"
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>}}
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- Why production SCION can't run over public internet
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- The "dedicated infrastructure" requirement hidden in plain sight
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- How SSFN replaced MPLS with... more private links
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- SRv6: The IETF standard that makes SCION redundant
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- Axpo Systems: Sells SCION, deploys SRv6 for ASTRA highways
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="Credit Suisse: 3,000 Applications and Counting"
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subtitle="Inside the IT nightmare that keeps UBS executives awake at night"
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category="Investigation"
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date="November 2024"
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link="/articles/credit-suisse-3000-applications-legacy/"
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>}}
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- "Pretty much every department built and maintained its own risk systems"
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- UBS keeping only 10% of Credit Suisse's 3,000 applications
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- USD 14 billion integration budget (and rising)
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- The Deutsche Bank warning: how IT integrations go wrong
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="Swisscom: 8 Hours Without Emergency Calls"
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subtitle="When Switzerland's telecom monopoly took emergency numbers offline during a flood"
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category="Investigation"
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date="July 2024"
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link="/articles/swisscom-8-hours-no-emergency-calls/"
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>}}
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- Emergency numbers 112, 117, 118, 144 unreachable for 8 hours
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- Cause: "A software update led to a malfunction that triggered a domino effect"
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- CEO: "Our networks are among the best in the world"
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- Third major outage in four years
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="Juris X: Zürich's 16-Year IT Odyssey"
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subtitle="How the canton's justice system spent CHF 36 million to keep running 30-year-old software"
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category="Investigation"
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date="June 2022"
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link="/articles/juris-x-zurich-16-year-odyssey/"
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>}}
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- 16 years attempting to replace case management software
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- Two failed projects: CHF 24 million + CHF 15.6 million
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- Parliamentary verdict: "Scheitern mit Ansage" (failure foretold)
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- Current system: 30+ years old and still running
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="SECO IT Corruption: CHF 99 Million in Contracts"
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subtitle="When a single civil servant awards contracts without bidding and nobody notices for a decade"
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category="Investigation"
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date="February 2021"
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link="/articles/seco-it-corruption-99-million-reasons/"
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>}}
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- CHF 99 million in IT contracts awarded without public bidding
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- CHF 1.7 million in bribes over 10 years
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- Zero internal controls caught the scheme
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- Discovered by journalists, not auditors
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="Swiss E-Voting: The Hackers Were Right"
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subtitle="How security researchers killed Switzerland's 'third way' of voting in weeks"
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category="Investigation"
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date="August 2020"
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link="/articles/swiss-e-voting-the-hackers-were-right/"
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>}}
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- University of Melbourne researchers found critical cryptographic flaw
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- Votes could be altered during shuffling without detection
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- 15 years of development, collapsed in months
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- Nine cantons forced to stop offering e-voting
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="INSIEME: The CHF 116 Million Lesson"
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subtitle="How Switzerland's tax administration spent a decade and nine figures on software that never existed"
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category="Investigation"
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date="March 2020"
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link="/articles/insieme-the-116-million-lesson/"
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>}}
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- 12 years, CHF 116 million, zero usable code
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- Director served as client, sponsor, and project manager simultaneously
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- Corruption and bribery charges filed
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- The postmortem found "silo mentality" and "leadership weakness"
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{{< /article-card >}}
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