Add Swiss IT disaster articles and homepage article cards
Created 6 new investigative articles covering Swiss IT failures from 2020-2024: - INSIEME: CHF 116M tax software failure (2020-03) - Swiss E-Voting: Security flaw cancellation (2020-08) - SECO Corruption: CHF 99M contract scandal (2021-02) - Juris X: Zürich's 16-year software odyssey (2022-06) - Swisscom: 8-hour emergency services outage (2024-07) - Credit Suisse: 3,000 applications integration nightmare (2024-11) Added article-card shortcode and CSS for homepage layout. Updated homepage to display all investigations with featured cards. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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title: "SCION: The Emperor's New Internet?"
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category: "Investigation"
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subtitle: "After 16 years and millions in funding, Switzerland's \"revolutionary\" internet architecture still requires the same expensive private infrastructure it promised to replace."
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source: "Analysis based on IETF documentation, official SCION specs, and ISP deployment data"
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title: "SwissFini.sh"
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---
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SCION (Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-generation Networks) represents peak Swiss tech nationalism — a "clean-slate" internet architecture from ETH Zurich that's been in development since 2009. The promise was revolutionary: path-aware networking that would give enterprises unprecedented control over their data's journey across the internet, with security properties that would make BGP hijacking and DDoS attacks things of the past.
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{{< article-card
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title="SCION: The Emperor's New Internet?"
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subtitle="After 16 years and millions in funding, Switzerland's \"revolutionary\" internet architecture still requires the same expensive private infrastructure it promised to replace."
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category="Investigation"
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date="December 2025"
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link="/articles/scion-vs-sdwan/"
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featured="true"
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>}}
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- Why production SCION can't run over public internet
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- The "dedicated infrastructure" requirement hidden in plain sight
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- How SSFN replaced MPLS with... more private links
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- SRv6: The IETF standard that makes SCION redundant
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- Axpo Systems: Sells SCION, deploys SRv6 for ASTRA highways
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{{< /article-card >}}
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The Swiss Secure Finance Network (SSFN), connecting over 300 financial institutions, is held up as proof that SCION has moved from academic theory to production reality. Swisscom, Sunrise, and SWITCH have all deployed SCION infrastructure. The SCION Association boasts of a "BGP-free" future.
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{{< article-card
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title="Credit Suisse: 3,000 Applications and Counting"
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subtitle="Inside the IT nightmare that keeps UBS executives awake at night"
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category="Investigation"
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date="November 2024"
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link="/articles/credit-suisse-3000-applications-legacy/"
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>}}
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- "Pretty much every department built and maintained its own risk systems"
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- UBS keeping only 10% of Credit Suisse's 3,000 applications
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- USD 14 billion integration budget (and rising)
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- The Deutsche Bank warning: how IT integrations go wrong
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{{< /article-card >}}
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But a closer look at the actual deployment architecture reveals an uncomfortable truth that the marketing materials carefully obscure. When you dig into the IETF documentation and the technical specifications, you find a revealing admission about what SCION actually requires to deliver on its security promises...
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{{< article-card
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title="Swisscom: 8 Hours Without Emergency Calls"
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subtitle="When Switzerland's telecom monopoly took emergency numbers offline during a flood"
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category="Investigation"
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date="July 2024"
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link="/articles/swisscom-8-hours-no-emergency-calls/"
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>}}
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- Emergency numbers 112, 117, 118, 144 unreachable for 8 hours
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- Cause: "A software update led to a malfunction that triggered a domino effect"
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- CEO: "Our networks are among the best in the world"
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- Third major outage in four years
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{{< /article-card >}}
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<div class="fade-overlay">
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<div class="paywall-box">
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<h2>Continue Reading</h2>
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<p>Discover what the SCION marketing doesn't tell you:</p>
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<ul class="teaser-list">
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<li>Why production SCION can't run over public internet</li>
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<li>The "dedicated infrastructure" requirement hidden in plain sight</li>
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<li>How SSFN replaced MPLS with... more private links</li>
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<li>SCION's missing encryption layer vs SD-WAN</li>
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<li>SRv6: The IETF standard that makes SCION redundant</li>
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<li>Axpo Systems: Sells SCION, deploys SRv6 for ASTRA highways</li>
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</ul>
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<a href="/articles/scion-vs-sdwan/" class="cta-button">Read Full Analysis</a>
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<span class="free-label">No paywall. No subscription. Just facts.</span>
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</div>
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</div>
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{{< article-card
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title="Juris X: Zürich's 16-Year IT Odyssey"
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subtitle="How the canton's justice system spent CHF 36 million to keep running 30-year-old software"
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category="Investigation"
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date="June 2022"
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link="/articles/juris-x-zurich-16-year-odyssey/"
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>}}
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- 16 years attempting to replace case management software
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- Two failed projects: CHF 24 million + CHF 15.6 million
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- Parliamentary verdict: "Scheitern mit Ansage" (failure foretold)
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- Current system: 30+ years old and still running
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="SECO IT Corruption: CHF 99 Million in Contracts"
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subtitle="When a single civil servant awards contracts without bidding and nobody notices for a decade"
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category="Investigation"
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date="February 2021"
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link="/articles/seco-it-corruption-99-million-reasons/"
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>}}
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- CHF 99 million in IT contracts awarded without public bidding
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- CHF 1.7 million in bribes over 10 years
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- Zero internal controls caught the scheme
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- Discovered by journalists, not auditors
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="Swiss E-Voting: The Hackers Were Right"
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subtitle="How security researchers killed Switzerland's 'third way' of voting in weeks"
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category="Investigation"
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date="August 2020"
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link="/articles/swiss-e-voting-the-hackers-were-right/"
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>}}
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- University of Melbourne researchers found critical cryptographic flaw
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- Votes could be altered during shuffling without detection
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- 15 years of development, collapsed in months
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- Nine cantons forced to stop offering e-voting
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{{< /article-card >}}
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{{< article-card
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title="INSIEME: The CHF 116 Million Lesson"
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subtitle="How Switzerland's tax administration spent a decade and nine figures on software that never existed"
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category="Investigation"
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date="March 2020"
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link="/articles/insieme-the-116-million-lesson/"
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>}}
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- 12 years, CHF 116 million, zero usable code
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- Director served as client, sponsor, and project manager simultaneously
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- Corruption and bribery charges filed
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- The postmortem found "silo mentality" and "leadership weakness"
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{{< /article-card >}}
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