Initial commit: cleaned project structure
- Consolidated documentation from Ralph Loop iterations - Archived 20+ outdated/superseded files to .archive/ - Kept essential docs: OIDC integration, mobile setup, quick start - Added operational scripts for health monitoring and backup - Research artifacts preserved in .tasks/artifacts/ Current state: - 3 VPS sites (fry, proton, photon) ONLINE in Pangolin - brn-home site pending for local services (Jellyfin, etc.) - Mobile access configuration pending Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Architecture Validation: Authentik + Pangolin + Guacamole
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**Validation Date:** 2026-01-20
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**Purpose:** Review proposed SSO infrastructure architecture for multi-site deployment
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---
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## Executive Summary
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**VERDICT:** ✅ **APPROVED WITH CRITICAL MODIFICATIONS**
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The proposed architecture (Authentik + Pangolin + Guacamole) is sound for your use case with **one critical exception**: the Guacamole/RDP integration has fundamental limitations that require architectural workarounds.
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### Key Findings
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| Component | Status | Confidence | Notes |
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|-----------|--------|------------|-------|
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| **Authentik** | ✅ RECOMMENDED | High | Best choice for self-hosted SSO in 2026 |
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| **Pangolin** | ✅ RECOMMENDED | High | Superior to Cloudflare Tunnel for self-hosted |
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| **Guacamole + OIDC** | ⚠️ APPROVED WITH CAVEATS | Medium | RDP NLA incompatibility requires workarounds |
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---
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## 1. Authentik Validation
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### Research Findings
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**Market Position (2026):**
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- Authentik has emerged as the **leading modern SSO solution** for self-hosted environments
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- Superior to Keycloak for small/medium deployments (lower complexity, better UX)
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- Superior to Authelia (full IdP vs just forward auth)
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- MIT licensed, active development, 19.6k GitHub stars
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**Key Strengths:**
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- **Modern architecture:** Written in Python (Django), not Java like Keycloak
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- **Lower resource requirements:** Documented to run well with 2GB RAM total
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- **Better UX:** Admin interface significantly easier than Keycloak
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- **Full protocol support:** OIDC, OAuth2, SAML2, LDAP, RADIUS
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- **Native MFA:** TOTP, WebAuthn, Duo, all built-in
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- **Expression policies:** Powerful Python-based policy engine
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**For Your Use Case:**
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- ✅ Single-user deployment supported (minimal resource config documented)
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- ✅ Service account support for API tokens (Jellyfin mobile apps)
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- ✅ MFA enforcement per-application (can require for Guacamole only)
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- ✅ Proven integration with Guacamole, Jellyfin SSO plugin, OpenWebUI
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- ✅ Active documentation for Pangolin integration
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**Alternatives Considered:**
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- **Keycloak:** Overkill for single-user, 4GB+ RAM, steeper learning curve
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- **Authelia:** Limited to forward auth, no full OIDC provider capabilities
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- **Zitadel:** Newer, less proven integrations
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**RECOMMENDATION:** ✅ **Use Authentik as proposed**
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---
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## 2. Pangolin Validation
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### Research Findings
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**Market Position (2026):**
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- Pangolin is the **leading self-hosted alternative to Cloudflare Tunnel**
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- Open-source (fosrl/pangolin, 18.2k GitHub stars)
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- Built on proven tech: WireGuard + Traefik reverse proxy
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- Active community, recently featured in major tech channels (Christian Lempa, NetworkChuck)
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**Key Strengths:**
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- **Self-hosted control plane:** You own all infrastructure, no third-party dependencies
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- **Identity-aware access control:** Native OIDC integration with Authentik
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- **Dual mode:** Tunneled reverse proxy + VPN-style private resource access
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- **No inbound ports required:** WireGuard outbound tunnels from private networks
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- **Automatic SSL:** Let's Encrypt integration via Traefik
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- **Mobile support:** Native apps + WireGuard config export
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**Architecture Components:**
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1. **Pangolin (Control Plane):** Dashboard, API, WebSocket server, auth system
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2. **Gerbil (Tunnel Manager):** WireGuard interface management
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3. **Newt (Edge Client):** Runs on private networks (brn, VPS hosts)
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4. **Traefik (Reverse Proxy):** TLS termination, routing, load balancing
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5. **Badger (Auth Middleware):** OIDC authentication enforcement
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**For Your Use Case:**
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- ✅ **Replaces WireGuard mesh:** Current 10.51.0.0/24 network becomes Pangolin sites
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- ✅ **Centralized on brn:** Control plane on physically secure host
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- ✅ **VPS integration:** Newt clients on fry, proton, photon for site-to-site routing
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- ✅ **Mobile access:** Apps for pixel9pro, pixel6pro
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- ✅ **Granular ACLs:** Per-service, per-user access control via Authentik
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**Comparison to Alternatives:**
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| Solution | Ownership | Cost | Mobile | OIDC | Complexity |
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|----------|-----------|------|--------|------|------------|
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| **Pangolin** | Self-hosted | Free | ✅ | ✅ | Medium |
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| Cloudflare Tunnel | Cloudflare | Free | ⚠️ Limited | ✅ | Low |
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| Tailscale | Tailscale | $5/user | ✅ | ⚠️ Enterprise | Low |
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| Headscale | Self-hosted | Free | ✅ | ❌ | Medium |
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**Critical Findings:**
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- ✅ **OIDC redirect URI:** `https://tunnel.obr.sh/api/v1/auth/callback`
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- ✅ **Required scopes:** openid, profile, email, groups
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- ✅ **Site architecture:** Each location (brn LAN, fry, proton) becomes a "Site"
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- ✅ **Resource types:** Public (HTTPS with domains) + Private (TCP/UDP for VPN access)
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**RECOMMENDATION:** ✅ **Use Pangolin as proposed**
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---
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## 3. Guacamole Validation
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### Research Findings
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**Market Position (2026):**
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- Apache Guacamole remains the **leading open-source clientless RDP gateway**
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- No viable open-source alternatives with equivalent feature set
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- Active Apache project, version 1.6.0 current
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**OIDC Support:**
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- ✅ Native OIDC extension available
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- ✅ Documented Authentik integration guide
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- ✅ Works well for **authentication to Guacamole dashboard**
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### ⚠️ CRITICAL LIMITATION DISCOVERED
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**RDP NLA + OIDC Incompatibility:**
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The research uncovered a **fundamental architectural limitation**:
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**Problem:**
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1. **RDP Network Level Authentication (NLA)** requires username/password for NTLM/Kerberos authentication
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2. **OIDC authentication** never provides the user's password to Guacamole
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3. Variables available: `${GUAC_USERNAME}` ✅, `${GUAC_PASSWORD}` ❌
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4. **Result:** Cannot use NLA with OIDC authentication
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**Security Implications:**
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- **NLA is recommended security best practice** for RDP (encrypts credentials before RDP connection)
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- **Disabling NLA** exposes credentials during connection handshake
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- **Windows 11** (argon) defaults to requiring NLA
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**Workarounds Available:**
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| Option | Security | User Experience | Implementation |
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|--------|----------|-----------------|----------------|
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| **1. Disable NLA** | ⚠️ Lower | Seamless SSO | Easy - disable in Guacamole connection config |
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| **2. Prompt for credentials** | ✅ High | Double login | Medium - configure in Guacamole |
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| **3. Service account** | ⚠️ Medium | Seamless SSO | Easy - hardcode credentials, lose audit trail |
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| **4. Use CAS instead of OIDC** | ✅ High | Seamless SSO | Hard - requires ClearPass Receiver on Windows |
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### Recommended Approach for Your Deployment
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**Since this is single-user (you) accessing your own workstation (argon):**
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**RECOMMENDED:** **Option 1 - Disable NLA**
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**Rationale:**
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- Low risk: You're the only user, accessing your own machine
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- Network already secured: Guacamole only accessible via Pangolin tunnel + Authentik SSO + MFA
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- User experience: Best (seamless SSO with TOTP)
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- Defense in depth: Multiple layers (MFA on Authentik, network isolation via Pangolin)
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**Implementation:**
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```yaml
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# In Guacamole connection config for argon-rdp:
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security: rdp # Use standard RDP security instead of NLA
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ignore-cert: true # Accept self-signed certs
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```
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**Additional Security Mitigations:**
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1. ✅ Enforce MFA on Guacamole application in Authentik (TOTP required)
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2. ✅ Restrict Guacamole to Pangolin tunnel only (no public WAN access)
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3. ✅ Enable Guacamole session recording for audit trail
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4. ✅ Configure Windows Firewall on argon to only allow RDP from brn (10.50.0.74)
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**Alternative for Future Multi-User:**
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If you later add users, switch to **Option 2 (prompt for credentials)** to maintain per-user accountability.
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**RECOMMENDATION:** ✅ **Use Guacamole with NLA disabled, compensated by MFA + Pangolin isolation**
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---
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## 4. Service Integration Validation
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### Jellyfin SSO
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**Status:** ✅ **FULLY SUPPORTED**
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**Plugin:** SSO-Auth plugin from Jellyfin catalog
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**Key Findings:**
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- ✅ Authentik integration well-documented
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- ⚠️ **Critical:** Mobile apps (Android/iOS) have limited OIDC support
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- ✅ **Solution:** Use "Quick Connect" feature for mobile (6-digit code pairing)
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- ✅ Alternative: API tokens for dedicated devices
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**Configuration:**
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- Provider type: Generic OpenID
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- Client auth: `client_secret_post` (NOT `client_secret_basic`)
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- Claims: roles via `groups` claim
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- Scopes: openid, profile, email, groups
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**Mobile App Strategy:**
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1. **Primary:** Quick Connect (user logs in via web SSO, enters code in app)
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2. **Secondary:** API tokens per device (generated in Jellyfin dashboard)
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---
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### OpenWebUI SSO
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**Status:** ✅ **FULLY SUPPORTED**
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**Native OIDC:** No plugin required
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**Key Findings:**
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- ✅ Robust OIDC implementation since v0.7.1+
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- ✅ **Role-based admin designation** via `OAUTH_ADMIN_ROLES`
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- ✅ JIT group provisioning with `ENABLE_OAUTH_GROUP_CREATION`
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- ✅ Automatic role synchronization on every login
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**Configuration Variables:**
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```bash
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OPENID_PROVIDER_URL=https://sso.obr.sh/application/o/openwebui/.well-known/openid-configuration
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OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=<from_authentik>
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OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=<from_authentik>
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ENABLE_OAUTH_ROLE_MANAGEMENT=true
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OAUTH_ROLES_CLAIM=groups
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OAUTH_ADMIN_ROLES=openwebui-admins
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```
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**Redirect URI:** `https://ll.obr.sh/oauth/oidc/callback`
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---
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### Gitea SSO (fry + proton)
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**Status:** ✅ **FULLY SUPPORTED**
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**Native OIDC:** Built-in authentication source
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**Configuration:**
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- Type: OAuth2
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- Provider: OpenID Connect
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- Auto Discovery URL: `https://sso.obr.sh/application/o/gitea/.well-known/openid-configuration`
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- Admin role mapping: Via Authentik groups
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**Note:** Gitea instances remain **publicly accessible** (federated nature), SSO is optional login method
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---
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### Transmission
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**Status:** ⚠️ **NO SSO SUPPORT**
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**Current:** HTTP Basic Authentication
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**Recommendation:**
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- Keep existing basic auth
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- Protect behind Pangolin tunnel only (no public WAN access)
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- Consider forward auth middleware via Traefik if SSO required
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---
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### Mastodon (bern.social)
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**Status:** ✅ **NO CHANGES NEEDED**
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**Reason:** Public federated service, should remain publicly accessible
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**Recommendation:** Do not integrate with SSO, keep existing authentication
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---
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## 5. Architectural Risks & Mitigations
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### Risk Matrix
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| Risk | Severity | Probability | Mitigation |
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|------|----------|-------------|------------|
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| **Authentik failure = total auth outage** | High | Low | Backup recovery codes, PostgreSQL backups, consider HA |
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| **Pangolin control plane failure** | Medium | Low | Services still accessible via LAN, failover to WireGuard |
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| **RDP NLA disabled security concern** | Medium | Medium | Compensate with MFA + network isolation |
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| **Mobile app SSO limitations (Jellyfin)** | Low | High | Use Quick Connect, document for users |
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| **DNS failure (sso.obr.sh unreachable)** | High | Low | Local /etc/hosts entries as backup |
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### Single Points of Failure
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**Authentik (sso.obr.sh):**
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- **Impact:** All SSO authentication fails
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- **Mitigation:**
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- Regular PostgreSQL backups (`pg_dump`)
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- Store recovery codes offline
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- Document emergency admin access procedure
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- Consider Docker volume backups
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|
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**Pangolin (tunnel.obr.sh):**
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- **Impact:** Mobile/remote access fails, VPS sites unreachable
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- **Mitigation:**
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- Services still accessible from LAN (Traefik routes remain)
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- Keep existing WireGuard as emergency fallback
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- Document manual WireGuard reconnection procedure
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**brn Host (10.50.0.74):**
|
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- **Impact:** Total control plane failure (Authentik, Pangolin, Guacamole)
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- **Mitigation:**
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- Physical host security (already planned)
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- UPS for power stability
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- Backup restore procedure documented
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- Consider VM snapshots before changes
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### Backup Strategy
|
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**Critical Data:**
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1. **Authentik PostgreSQL database** - `pg_dump` daily, keep 7 days
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2. **Authentik media files** - `/srv/docker/authentik/media/`
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3. **Pangolin configuration** - `/srv/docker/pangolin/` database and config
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4. **Guacamole PostgreSQL database** - connection definitions
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5. **Traefik dynamic config** - `/srv/docker/traefik/traefik_dynamic.yaml`
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|
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**Backup Script:** See `/home/olaf/pangolin/.tasks/artifacts/backup-strategy.md` (TODO: create)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Alternative Architectures Considered
|
||||
|
||||
### Alternative A: Keycloak instead of Authentik
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||||
|
||||
**Pros:**
|
||||
- More mature (13 years vs 6 years)
|
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- Enterprise-grade features
|
||||
- Larger community (32k stars vs 19k)
|
||||
|
||||
**Cons:**
|
||||
- Higher resource requirements (4GB+ RAM)
|
||||
- Steeper learning curve
|
||||
- Overkill for single-user deployment
|
||||
- Java-based (vs Python for Authentik)
|
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|
||||
**Verdict:** ❌ Rejected - unnecessary complexity for use case
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Alternative B: Cloudflare Tunnel instead of Pangolin
|
||||
|
||||
**Pros:**
|
||||
- Lower operational burden (managed service)
|
||||
- Global edge network
|
||||
- Built-in DDoS protection
|
||||
- Simpler setup
|
||||
|
||||
**Cons:**
|
||||
- Third-party dependency (Cloudflare controls routing)
|
||||
- Limited customization
|
||||
- No VPN-style private resource access
|
||||
- Privacy concerns (traffic visibility)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict:** ❌ Rejected - plan specifies self-hosted control
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Alternative C: Tailscale instead of Pangolin
|
||||
|
||||
**Pros:**
|
||||
- Easier setup
|
||||
- Better mobile apps
|
||||
- NAT traversal superior (DERP relays)
|
||||
|
||||
**Cons:**
|
||||
- Pricing: $5/user/month after 3 devices
|
||||
- Control plane dependency on Tailscale servers
|
||||
- Limited reverse proxy features
|
||||
- No identity-aware access control without ACL tags
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict:** ❌ Rejected - cost and third-party dependency
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Alternative D: No RDP Gateway (Direct RDP)
|
||||
|
||||
**Pros:**
|
||||
- Simpler architecture
|
||||
- No NLA compatibility issues
|
||||
|
||||
**Cons:**
|
||||
- Requires RDP client installation on devices
|
||||
- No web-based access (can't use from Chromebook, iPad browser)
|
||||
- No session recording capability
|
||||
- Less secure (direct exposure vs gateway)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict:** ❌ Rejected - Guacamole provides superior UX and security
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Final Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
### ✅ APPROVED Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
**Core Components:**
|
||||
1. **Authentik** at `sso.obr.sh` - SSO/IdP
|
||||
2. **Pangolin** at `tunnel.obr.sh` - Tunneled reverse proxy
|
||||
3. **Guacamole** at `remote.obr.sh` - RDP gateway (NLA disabled)
|
||||
|
||||
### 🔧 Required Modifications to Original Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Guacamole RDP Connection:**
|
||||
- Change from "NLA security" to "Standard RDP security"
|
||||
- Enable session recording for audit trail
|
||||
- Configure Windows Firewall on argon to only allow brn
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Authentik MFA Policy:**
|
||||
- Create separate policy for Guacamole application (TOTP required)
|
||||
- Optional for other services (Jellyfin, OpenWebUI) based on preference
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Jellyfin Mobile Strategy:**
|
||||
- Document Quick Connect procedure for mobile apps
|
||||
- Create API tokens for persistent devices (TV apps)
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Transmission:**
|
||||
- Keep HTTP basic auth (no OIDC support)
|
||||
- Access via Pangolin tunnel only
|
||||
|
||||
### 📋 Implementation Order Validation
|
||||
|
||||
The plan's phased approach is sound:
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 1: Authentik** ✅
|
||||
- Foundation for all SSO
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 2: Pangolin** ✅
|
||||
- Requires Authentik for OIDC
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 3: Guacamole** ✅
|
||||
- Requires Authentik for OIDC
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 4: Service Integration** ✅
|
||||
- Requires Authentik + Pangolin operational
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 5: Traefik Restriction** ✅
|
||||
- Only after Pangolin sites verified working
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 6: Mobile Setup** ✅
|
||||
- Final verification step
|
||||
|
||||
**Order is correct:** Sequential dependencies respected
|
||||
|
||||
### 🎯 Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Deployment successful when:**
|
||||
1. ✅ Can login to Authentik admin via `sso.obr.sh`
|
||||
2. ✅ Can login to Pangolin dashboard via `tunnel.obr.sh` (SSO redirect)
|
||||
3. ✅ Can access Guacamole via `remote.obr.sh` (SSO + MFA)
|
||||
4. ✅ Can connect to argon RDP via Guacamole web interface
|
||||
5. ✅ Can access Jellyfin via Pangolin mobile app (with Quick Connect)
|
||||
6. ✅ Can access OpenWebUI via Pangolin tunnel (SSO login)
|
||||
7. ✅ Jellyfin/OpenWebUI/Transmission return 404 from public WAN
|
||||
8. ✅ VPS hosts (fry, proton) show connected in Pangolin dashboard
|
||||
|
||||
### ⚠️ Rollback Plan
|
||||
|
||||
**Critical checkpoints:**
|
||||
1. After TASK-005 (Authentik deploy): Services still work without SSO
|
||||
2. After TASK-009 (Pangolin sites): Traefik routes still public
|
||||
3. **After TASK-024 (Traefik restriction): CRITICAL CHECKPOINT**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rollback procedure:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Emergency: restore public access
|
||||
sudo cp /home/olaf/pangolin/.tasks/artifacts/traefik_dynamic.yaml.backup \
|
||||
/srv/docker/traefik/traefik_dynamic.yaml
|
||||
docker exec traefik kill -SIGHUP 1 # Reload Traefik config
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 📊 Resource Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
**brn Host (10.50.0.74) Additional Load:**
|
||||
- Authentik: +2GB RAM, +2 CPU cores
|
||||
- Pangolin: +1GB RAM, +1 CPU core
|
||||
- Guacamole: +1GB RAM, +1 CPU core
|
||||
- **Total:** +4GB RAM, +4 CPU cores
|
||||
|
||||
**Current brn specs needed:** Minimum 8GB RAM, 4-6 CPU cores recommended
|
||||
|
||||
### 🔒 Security Posture
|
||||
|
||||
**Improvements:**
|
||||
- ✅ Centralized authentication (single MFA enrollment)
|
||||
- ✅ Granular per-service access control
|
||||
- ✅ Session recording for RDP access
|
||||
- ✅ Network segmentation via Pangolin tunnels
|
||||
- ✅ Elimination of password sprawl
|
||||
|
||||
**Trade-offs:**
|
||||
- ⚠️ RDP NLA disabled (compensated by MFA + network isolation)
|
||||
- ⚠️ Single point of failure (brn host)
|
||||
|
||||
**Overall:** ✅ **Net security improvement**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
**FINAL VERDICT:** ✅ **ARCHITECTURE APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION**
|
||||
|
||||
**The proposed Authentik + Pangolin + Guacamole architecture is sound and recommended with the following conditions:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Acknowledge RDP NLA limitation and implement compensating controls
|
||||
2. Follow phased implementation order as specified
|
||||
3. Create backup strategy before starting (TASK-027)
|
||||
4. Test thoroughly at each phase before proceeding
|
||||
5. Document emergency rollback procedures
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence Level:** **85%**
|
||||
|
||||
**Remaining 15% risk factors:**
|
||||
- Pangolin relatively new in production (1 year track record)
|
||||
- Guacamole NLA workaround requires security discipline
|
||||
- Single-user deployment lacks redundancy
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommendation to proceed:** ✅ **YES**
|
||||
|
||||
**Next step:** Execute research-informed implementation starting with TASK-003 (Create Authentik Compose) using insights from RESEARCH-002 and TASK-001 outputs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Validation completed by:** Claude Code
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-01-20
|
||||
**Research artifacts referenced:** RESEARCH-001 through RESEARCH-005, TASK-001
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user